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Abstract 
 
The paper dwells on the making of Hegel’s The 
Phenomenology of Spirit narrative. The author aims to 
substantiate the idea that the creative process was 
determined by a combination of two principles, both 
introducing a conceptual structure that was not 
related to the specific historical and cultural content. 
Firstly, the structure of the expanding text 
corresponds to the structure of The Phenomenology’s 
object that encompasses the observing consciousness, 
the observed consciousness and its object; secondly, 
the movement of experience on each of the three 
specified levels ends with reaching the same logical 
form of relating consciousness to the infinity. The 
object is highly specific as it implies the need for 
revealing semantic structures covertly present in the 
Hegelian text. This predetermines the need to use 
special methodological approaches (that would allow 
separating the formal aspect of the “experience of 
consciousness” from its content and present it in as an 
independent complexly organized conceptual 
construction) along with traditional methods of 
historical and philosophical research. Such approaches 
include identifying of three types of consciousness, 
acting as subjects of “experience”; revealing the 
structural isomorphism of “experience of 
consciousness”, hidden behind The Phenomenology of 
Spirit’s external variety of topics. Finally, the author 
comes to the conclusion that the method of 
constructing the narrative chosen by Hegel leads to 
the liberation of the subject of consciousness, which is 
characterized at each of the stages of the movement 
by meaningful diversity. It leads from the connection 
with “sustainable existence” and tracing it to the 
structure of “infinity” toward self-consciousness. This 
analysis of The Phenomenology of Spirit narrative is 
novel in that the conceptual integrity of the work is 
based on identifying the structure of the narrative, and 
not by trying to establish a single epistemological, 
psychological and historical line of content 
development. In addition, since one of the main 
difficulties in justifying The Phenomenology’s integrity 
has always been associated with the heterogeneity of 
its content and the seeming unexpectedness of 
passages and shifts in the process of describing the 
experience of consciousness, the author considers the 
  Resumen  
 
El artículo se centra en la elaboración de la narrativa 
de Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel. El autor 
pretende fundamentar la idea de que el proceso 
creativo estuvo determinado por una combinación de 
dos principios, ambos introduciendo una estructura 
conceptual que no estaba relacionada con el 
contenido histórico y cultural específico. En primer 
lugar, la estructura del texto en expansión 
corresponde a la estructura del objeto de la 
Fenomenología que abarca la conciencia 
observadora, la conciencia observada y su objeto; en 
segundo lugar, el movimiento de la experiencia en 
cada uno de los tres niveles especificados termina con 
alcanzar la misma forma lógica de relacionar la 
conciencia con el infinito. El objeto es altamente 
específico ya que implica la necesidad de revelar 
estructuras semánticas presentes de forma 
encubierta en el texto hegeliano. Esto predetermina 
la necesidad de utilizar enfoques metodológicos 
especiales (que permitirían separar el aspecto formal 
de la "experiencia de la conciencia" de su contenido y 
presentarla como una construcción conceptual 
independiente, organizada de manera compleja) junto 
con los métodos tradicionales de investigación 
histórica y filosófica. Tales enfoques incluyen la 
identificación de tres tipos de conciencia, actuando 
como sujetos de "experiencia"; Revelando el 
isomorfismo estructural de la "experiencia de la 
conciencia", oculto detrás de la variedad externa de 
temas de La Fenomenología del Espíritu. Finalmente, 
el autor llega a la conclusión de que el método de 
construcción de la narrativa elegida por Hegel 
conduce a la liberación del sujeto de la conciencia, 
que se caracteriza en cada una de las etapas del 
movimiento por una diversidad significativa. Conduce 
desde la conexión con la "existencia sostenible" y la 
rastrea a la estructura de "infinito" hacia la 
autoconciencia. Este análisis de la narrativa de La 
fenomenología del espíritu es novedoso en el sentido 
de que la integridad conceptual del trabajo se basa en 
la identificación de la estructura de la narrativa y no 
en el intento de establecer una única línea 
epistemológica, psicológica e histórica de desarrollo 
de contenido. Además, dado que una de las 
principales dificultades para justificar la integridad de 
The Phenomenology siempre se ha asociado con la 
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result as an important argument in defending the 
vision of Hegel’s opus as an integral and coherent one. 
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heterogeneidad de su contenido y la aparente 
inesperadaz de los pasajes y cambios en el proceso de 
descripción de la experiencia de la conciencia, el 
autor considera el resultado como un resultado 
importante. Argumento en la defensa de la visión de 
la obra de Hegel como integral y coherente. 
 
Palabras clave: idealismo alemán, filosofía 
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fenomenología de la estructura temática del espíritu, 
noción de infinito, Fenomenología de la estructura del 
espíritu, patrón de texto dialógico, autoconciencia. 
 
Resumo
 
El artículo se centra en la elaboración de la narrativa de Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel. El autor pretende 
fundamentar la idea de que el proceso creativo estuvo determinado por una combinación de dos principios, ambos 
introduciendo una estructura conceptual que no estaba relacionada con el contenido histórico y cultural específico. En 
primer lugar, la estructura del texto en expansión corresponde a la estructura del objeto de la Fenomenología que 
abarca la conciencia observadora, la conciencia observada y su objeto; en segundo lugar, el movimiento de la 
experiencia en cada uno de los tres niveles especificados termina con alcanzar la misma forma lógica de relacionar la 
conciencia con el infinito. El objeto es altamente específico ya que implica la necesidad de revelar estructuras 
semánticas presentes de forma encubierta en el texto hegeliano. Esto predetermina la necesidad de utilizar enfoques 
metodológicos especiales (que permitirían separar el aspecto formal de la "experiencia de la conciencia" de su 
contenido y presentarla como una construcción conceptual independiente, organizada de manera compleja) junto con 
los métodos tradicionales de investigación histórica y filosófica. Tales enfoques incluyen la identificación de tres tipos 
de conciencia, actuando como sujetos de "experiencia"; Revelando el isomorfismo estructural de la "experiencia de la 
conciencia", oculto detrás de la variedad externa de temas de La Fenomenología del Espíritu. Finalmente, el autor llega 
a la conclusión de que el método de construcción de la narrativa elegida por Hegel conduce a la liberación del sujeto 
de la conciencia, que se caracteriza en cada una de las etapas del movimiento por una diversidad significativa. Conduce 
desde la conexión con la "existencia sostenible" y la rastrea a la estructura de "infinito" hacia la autoconciencia. Este 
análisis de la narrativa de La fenomenología del espíritu es novedoso en el sentido de que la integridad conceptual del 
trabajo se basa en la identificación de la estructura de la narrativa y no en el intento de establecer una única línea 
epistemológica, psicológica e histórica de desarrollo de contenido. Además, dado que una de las principales dificultades 
para justificar la integridad de The Phenomenology siempre se ha asociado con la heterogeneidad de su contenido y la 
aparente inesperadaz de los pasajes y cambios en el proceso de descripción de la experiencia de la conciencia, el autor 
considera el resultado como un resultado importante. Argumento en la defensa de la visión de la obra de Hegel como 
integral y coherente. 
 
Palabras clave: idealismo alemán, filosofía hegeliana, La fenomenología del espíritu, La fenomenología de la 
estructura temática del espíritu, noción de infinito, Fenomenología de la estructura del espíritu, patrón de texto 
dialógico, autoconciencia. 
 
Abstrato.  
 
O artigo trata da produção da narrativa de Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit. O autor pretende fundamentar a 
ideia de que o processo criativo foi determinado por uma combinação de dois princípios, ambos introduzindo uma 
estrutura conceitual que não estava relacionada ao conteúdo histórico e cultural específico. Em primeiro lugar, a 
estrutura do texto em expansão corresponde à estrutura do objeto da Fenomenologia que engloba a consciência 
observadora, a consciência observada e seu objeto; em segundo lugar, o movimento da experiência em cada um dos 
três níveis especificados termina com a mesma forma lógica de relacionar a consciência ao infinito. O objeto é altamente 
específico, pois implica a necessidade de revelar estruturas semânticas presentes secretamente no texto hegeliano. 
Isso predetermina a necessidade de usar abordagens metodológicas especiais (que permitiriam separar o aspecto 
formal da “experiência de consciência” de seu conteúdo e apresentá-lo como uma construção conceitual independente 
organizada de forma complexa) juntamente com os métodos tradicionais de pesquisa histórica e filosófica. Tais 
abordagens incluem a identificação de três tipos de consciência, atuando como sujeitos de “experiência”; revelando o 
isomorfismo estrutural da “experiência de consciência”, oculto por trás da variedade externa de tópicos da 
Fenomenologia do Espírito. Finalmente, o autor chega à conclusão de que o método de construção da narrativa 
escolhido por Hegel leva à libertação do sujeito da consciência, que se caracteriza em cada uma das etapas do 
movimento pela diversidade significativa. Ela leva da conexão com a “existência sustentável” e a traça até a estrutura 
do “infinito” em direção à autoconsciência. Essa análise da narrativa da Fenomenologia do Espírito é novidade na 
medida em que a integridade conceitual do trabalho se baseia na identificação da estrutura da narrativa, e não na 
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tentativa de estabelecer uma única linha epistemológica, psicológica e histórica de desenvolvimento de conteúdo. Além 
disso, uma vez que uma das principais dificuldades em justificar a integridade da Fenomenologia sempre esteve 
associada à heterogeneidade de seu conteúdo e à aparente imprevisibilidade de passagens e mudanças no processo de 
descrever a experiência de consciência, o autor considera o resultado como um importante argumento em defender 
a visão da obra de Hegel como integral e coerente. 
 
Palavras-chave: idealismo alemão, filosofia hegeliana, fenomenologia do espírito, fenomenologia da estrutura do 
sujeito do espírito, noção de infinito, estrutura da fenomenologia do espírito, padrão de texto dialógico, 
autoconsciência. 
 
Introduction 
 
The analysis of the structural (formal) principles 
of The Phenomenology of Spirit plot composition is 
relevant because previous attempts to perceive 
the conceptual unity of the Hegelian work on the 
basis of various content interpretation patterns 
were unsuccessful (Bonsiepen, 1975; Haering, 
1932, 1934; Pöggeler, 1973). To some extent, 
the difficulties associated with “external” history 
of the book, are to be accounted for that (Hegel, 
1980). However, the fact that some sections are, 
essentially, sketches of varying degrees of 
elaboration still does not allow us to answer the 
question why it was so difficult for Hegel himself 
to determine the book’s place in the system of 
philosophy (Puntel, 1981). The history of The 
Phenomenology’s perception (within the first 
hundred years of its existence the book was 
almost forgotten later to become the subject of 
countless contradictory and, as a rule, 
fragmentary interpretations) is also unlikely to 
instill the usual hope that the commentary will 
make the task easier for the readers of 
philosophical texts. But the greatest difficulty is, 
of course, The Phenomenology of Spirit’s content 
itself, which is ultimately counters any kind of 
simplification and seems to rebel against the 
syntax of the ordinary language. Charm and 
bewilderment are, perhaps, the two main 
feelings that embrace the reader, plunging again 
and again into the Hegelian text. Even today G. 
Spet’s remark that “The Phenomenology of Spirit is 
considered to be a philosophical text that is one 
of the most difficult, if not the most difficult to 
understand” (Spet, 1959) should caution every 
reader against hasty judgments and assessments. 
 
However, according to the words of Hegel 
himself, a great man condemns (foredooms, 
verdammt) other people to have him explained 
(Hegel, 1971). As new papers and 
interpretations come along, the process of these 
“readers’ travels for discoveries” requires 
embracing the concepts that are absent in the 
Hegelian text itself arises. However, it was 
Hegel, who met this need, by finally replacing the 
original title The Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness with The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
Our methodological approach towards The 
Phenomenology endows the concept of 
“structure” with special significance. I will try to 
show that the principles of analyzing The 
Phenomenology of Spirit will make it possible to 
identify the plot, as well as to understand the 
need for content movement only if they are of a 
“structural” nature, that is predetermining the 
content’s selection, direction and regularities. 
 
Several levels of text can be distinguished in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit. In the process of 
analyzing the content of Hegelian thought each 
one of them is appropriate to be described in 
terms of structure. Firstly, it optimally 
characterizes the ratio of the observing 
consciousness, consciousness as a subject of 
consideration and the object of the latter. This 
ratio, which sets the conditions for the 
consideration of any content that will be included 
in the “experience of consciousness”, is precisely 
a “structure”, as it remains unchanged in the 
movement of experience and acts as a 
prerequisite for its description. The “behavior” 
of its elements is not determined by their 
content, internal characteristics (in this case, the 
Hegelian understanding of “experience” would 
have been analogous to Kantian one that requires 
“contact with reality” and going beyond the 
boundaries of consciousness), but only by the 
place they occupy in the system. Secondly, the 
analysis of The Phenomenology of Spirit reveals the 
homogeneity of the text’s fragments in which the 
“formal” relations of the elements are 
reproduced, constituting different in 
“phenomenological appearance”, but logically 
homogeneous structures. Thirdly, these stages 
of the movement of “experience of 
consciousness”, which we will call The 
Phenomenology’s “circles”, end with the same 
structure of the mediation of opposites 
(“knowledge” and “object”). This structure is 
“infinity”, which in The Phenomenology of Spirit is 
achieved solely as an object of consciousness, 
and which, as the definition of the nature of 
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speculative objectivity, will become the starting 
point of the movement of Science of Logic. 
Realizing that it is impossible to highlight the 
entire complex of these most complex and still 
insufficiently studied aspects of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit within the framework of 
one article, I intend to draw attention only to two 
structural principles of plot composition, namely, 
its dependence on the Hegelian concept of the 
structure of the object and the role of the 
concept of infinity in The Phenomenology’s 
movement. These are principles that differ in 
their origin and “nature”, but it is their 
combination that mainly determines the specifics 
of the plot of Hegel’s book. The problem that 
this study is aimed to solve, therefore, is to 
develop a unified model for the development of 
the plot, based on the formal, structural, 
principles of plot composition. 
 
Methodology 
 
The basis of the research's methodology is a 
combination of traditional historical, 
philosophical and hermeneutic methods. 
However, by drawing attention to the formal 
aspects of the development of the plot we attach 
more significance to the methods of structural 
and logical-linguistic analysis. Thus, the article 
attempts to identify the structure of the 
narrative's subject, which comprises three levels: 
the consciousness of the author and the reader 
(“our consciousness”, “we”), consciousness as an 
object of direct examination (“consciousness 
itself”) and its object. In the process of 
experiencing “our consciousness” looks at the 
object of “consciousness itself” with “its eyes”, 
and compares it with the understanding that 
“consciousness itself” makes up for itself about 
the object. From the very beginning the reader 
has to be aware of the dialogical nature of the 
Hegelian narration, as well as clearly differentiate 
among the “words” of these three “characters”. 
Each of the “voices” has its salient individuality, 
so the interpreter should try to recognize and 
convey it with using the language of his culture 
and his time. Just as each type of consciousness 
in the original book, responding to the gesture of 
the “director” (the author), played its distinctive 
role in the “philosophical performance” of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, so the interpretation 
should be watchful not allowing these “voices” to 
be confused. 
 
In the original German text, their distinction is 
clear (although the "technical clarity" of the text 
of The Phenomenology, of course, does not 
exclude the need for a theoretical understanding 
of the dialogical nature of the work within the 
framework of German Hegelian studies). But to 
convey this most important component of 
Hegel's book in translation into another language 
is extremely difficult. In the original, the borders 
of the “speech” of “our consciousness” are 
usually marked with wir, für uns, and the “voice” 
of the “consciousness itself” is separated with the 
help of es, ihm. The Hegelian text seems to be 
stitched by these pronouns; however, the 
variability of conveying the attribution of 
statements in the existing Russian translations 
does not allow the reader to determine definitely 
the relevance of one or another fragment of the 
“experience of consciousness” to the speech of 
“our consciousness” or “consciousness itself”.  
 
In addition, the text highlights entire fragments 
that, instead of presenting a “conversation” of 
“our consciousness”, “consciousness itself” and 
“object” with the exchange of short phrases, give 
extensive descriptions made by one of the 
“characters”. As a rule, the descriptions of the 
experience of “consciousness itself” are more 
extensive and sophisticated, since it, being 
included in the process of generating objectivity, 
“does not see” (like “our consciousness) patterns 
in its movement and makes many “mistakes”, as 
well as experiences many ways of 
comprehending objectivity. On the contrary, 
“our consciousness”, occupying a “more 
convenient” place in the structure of objectivity, 
does not have to repeat the “mistakes” of 
“consciousness itself”, and the way of its 
experience turns out to be “straighter” and 
“shorter”. Even these cursory remarks show 
how important it is to use the methods of 
structural and linguistic analysis, (even in 
seemingly classical historical-philosophical 
studies), when formal-structural — belonging to 
plot and “narrative” — aspects become their 
direct subject matter.  
 
Since from the very outset of discussing the 
contents of The Phenomenology it is important to 
represent accurately the structure of its 
objectness (or what “participants” will take the 
floor in the upcoming action, and what 
“elements” of consciousness they will set in 
motion), it is not surprising that this structure is 
present in the first sentence of the main text: 
“Knowledge which is our object at the outset, 
that is, immediately, can be nothing but 
immediate knowledge, knowledge of the 
immediate, that is, of what is” (Hegel, n.d.) 
(hereinafter, The Phenomenology of Spirit is cited 
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in Terry Pinkard’s translation). Thus, the 
description of the upcoming “experience of 
consciousness” has a kind of stratification of 
consciousness, the discernment of the points of 
view of the “observing” and “observed” 
consciousness, as its prerequisite. Then, after 
crossing the boundaries of the original idea of the 
Chapter VI, the same stratification affects the 
self-consciousness of its “object” as well.  
The comments presented show, how the 
comprehension of the structure of The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit’s object and the 
specificity of the method suggested by the 
author in the Introduction, is important for the 
understanding of the book. Therefore, it is 
impossible to accept the attempts of some 
students of Hegel to present the Introduction as 
an “early” fragment, which allegedly does not 
correspond to the content of the final work. For 
instance, O. Pöggeler had great doubts that the 
Introduction analysis can serve as a basis for 
understanding Hegel’s opus, since it was 
written in the context of making The Science of 
the Experience of Consciousness. Moreover, he 
even argued that after changing the name, the 
author had to get rid of the text that was 
originally supposed to open the book (Pöggeler, 
1973). It is not difficult to notice, however, that 
such a move would contradict not only the 
German researcher’s own intention to 
understand the philosopher through 
understanding his creative path, but also the 
task of an adequate understanding of The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit as being born as a 
result of the “substantial conversion” of The 
Science of the Experience of Consciousness at the 
point of its movement, where the spirit opens 
to consciousness as a unique objectness, 
embracing and substantiating all previous 
images of consciousness. The Science of the 
Experience of Consciousness defines the 
beginning of the work, its main idea and 
method, whereas The Phenomenology of Spirit 
marks its completion. The latter does not 
replace the former, but develops and fulfils its 
purpose. 
 
Out of the set of consequences of the 
Hegelian theory of the structure of the 
phenomenological objectness here we will 
indicate only the sequence of “experience” 
stages, as its comprehension is extremely 
important for determining an adequate method 
for interpreting Hegel’s work. To begin with, it 
is natural for Hegel and characteristic for his 
whole work and not only for The Phenomenology 
of Spirit, to correlate the structure of the work 
with the structure of objectness disclosing in it. 
However it is at odds with the popular in 
historical and philosophical literature (see, for 
example, G. Lukács's paper) comparison of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit content with the notions 
from Hegelian philosophy of spirit, such as 
“subjective spirit”, “objective spirit” and 
“absolute spirit”. Highlighting these rubrics 
(mainly taking into account pedagogical goals) 
within the boundaries of the encyclopedic 
system, Hegel takes into account not only the 
differences in the degree of expression of the 
content of the spirit, the depth of its 
“certainty”, but also the nature of the “carriers” 
of the spirit, which is in no way relevant for 
“experience of consciousness”, described in 
The Phenomenology, as its evolution is 
determined only by the structure of the 
phenomenological objectness.  
 
In accordance with this structure, the 
“experience”, culminating in the achievement of 
the same (from a logical point of view) goal, first 
accomplishes “our consciousness”, then 
“consciousness itself” and, finally, the “object”. 
Of course, it is unacceptable to present the 
phenomenological movement in a simplified, 
unnecessarily “mechanical” way, as if its stages 
can be represented as parts that are indifferent 
to each other. According to Hegel himself, The 
Phenomenology is a whole, which “by its very 
nature is ... a plexus of passages” (Hegel, 1971). 
But taking into account the specified interaction 
and “roll calls” “inside” each of the “experience” 
stages, it is still possible to distinguish the main 
lines of the narration interlocking at some highest 
point of the phenomenological movement, or 
more precisely, the “circles” that culminate in 
achieving the same goal , the same result, even if 
they acquire a different “phenomenological 
guise”. Only this path can make one see the 
meaningfulness and harmony of the Hegelian text 
as a whole and assess the merits of the method 
chosen by the thinker for constructing the plot of 
the book. 
 
Results 
 
The experience of “our consciousness”, the 
experience of “consciousness itself” and the 
experience of the “object” are completed with 
achieving the same goal and result from a logical 
point of view. What is the goal and what is the 
result? Actually, Hegel definitely answers the first 
part of this question in the Introduction. The goal, 
he writes, is where “the concept corresponds to 
the object and the object to the concept” (Hegel, 
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n.d.). In the “experience of consciousness”, “the 
concept” and “the object” are opposites. Their 
“correspondence” means that, going beyond its 
limits, the consciousness again finds itself.  
 
A reader familiar with Logic will easily recognize 
a fundamental dialectical-speculative structure 
behind these formulations, which, when first 
achieved in the course of a phenomenological 
movement, gets the name “infinity” (“true 
infinity” - in Science of Logic). “Infinity” is the 
single logical (formal-structural) result of the 
phenomenological movement, specifically seen 
and described by each of the participants of the 
“experience of consciousness”. How does Hegel 
represent “infinity” in The Phenomenology? As an 
“absolute concept of distinction ... as an inner 
distinction” (Hegel, n.d.), or “absolute 
restlessness of pure self-movement” (Hegel, 
n.d.), as “the pure alternating fluctuation, that is, 
the opposition within itself, the contradiction" 
(Hegel, n.d.). However the opposites as sides of 
internal contradiction receive “being” only 
because of each other, in relation to each other, 
and not in connection with some kind of 
“sustainable existence”, that is, “infinity” is no 
longer associated with “existence”, but is a 
“pure” structure, which will act as a model for 
constructing categories of Logic. Moreover, it can 
be said that such an understanding of “infinity” 
even goes beyond the boundaries of the image of 
“true infinity” that we will see in the “Doctrine 
of Being”, approaching “reflection” as an image 
of the dialectical-speculative method, revealed 
only in the “Doctrine of essence". 
 
It is noteworthy that, having exhausted the 
logical possibilities of describing “infinity” as an 
experience of thinking contradiction, Hegel 
creates a haunting image of “infinity”: “the simple 
essence of life, the soul of the world, the 
universal bloodstream, which is omnipresent, 
neither dulled nor interrupted by any distinction, 
which is to a greater degree, itself both every 
distinction as well as their sublatedness. It is 
therefore pulsating within itself without setting 
itself in motion; it is trembling within itself 
without itself being without agitated” (Hegel, 
n.d.). The origin and significance of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit’s imagery is one of the 
most interesting topics, which until now has 
rarely attracted the attention of researchers 
(with D. Ph. Verene’s book as an exception 
(Verene, 1985), as well as the works of other 
American authors, who were influenced by his 
thought, on the regularity of the appearance of 
figurative speech elements in The Phenomenology 
of Spirit, for example, (Magee, 2010; Ricci, 2013; 
Speight, 2001). Without pretending to cover the 
entire issue in this article, we will note that the 
need for addressing the figurative means of 
expression of thought is intensified in Hegel (and 
not only in the process of describing the 
experience of “our consciousness”, but in all the 
subsequent presentation) in presence of 
escalations of speculative concreteness. It can be 
assumed that figurativeness is a natural 
equivalent for consciousness to the concreteness 
of philosophical thought. The ground for this is 
already prepared by the language itself, which 
allows constructing philosophical terms from the 
same morphemes that are used in the vocabulary 
of everyday or poetic idiom. 
 
However, in our theoretical perspective the 
above-mentioned expressive characteristics are 
of interest not so much because they testify to 
the power of intuition of infinity in Hegel, but 
rather because having this intuition is the most 
important event in the movement of the 
“experience of consciousness”. The process of 
complication, “concretization” of the ratio of 
consciousness and the subject in the “infinity” 
reaches the highest degree of intensity. The 
absolute, complete and infinite nature of the 
mediation of opposites makes “pure self-
movement” indistinguishable from peace, 
therefore “infinity” should be defined precisely as 
a speculative structure that functions as a 
container for the movement of the categories 
from Science of Logic.  
 
The characteristic of “infinity” as a link 
between The Phenomenology and Logic brings us 
closer to understanding the relationship between 
the elements of the Jena project “Systems of 
Science”. Discussions about whether The 
Phenomenology should be presented as an 
“introduction” to the system or as its “first part”, 
which have been conducted in Hegelian studies 
for decades, turned out to be unproductive. It 
proved to be a mere “dispute over words”. It is 
important that The Phenomenology defines a 
structural model of logical objectivity, which 
makes primarily its self-movement clear.  
 
In the text of The Phenomenology there are 
fragments that suggest the possibility of direct 
correlation of its content with the future Logic 
(Hegel, n.d.). My own research, however, 
confirms the assumption that Logic should be 
correlated not with The Phenomenology as a 
whole, but with the logical content of its 
individual “circles”, which will be explicated in 
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the most detailed way in Science of Logic 
(Korotkikh, 2011, 2015). At the new stages of 
the phenomenological movement, this logical 
content does not deepen and does not change at 
all; it only appears to the “other consciousness”, 
while taking, as noted above, another 
“phenomenological guise”. Only the rhythmic 
appearance of the already familiar “infinity” 
structure (even if not already called by this name) 
clearly marks the narrative space of the future 
movement of The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 
In the concluding remarks of Chapter III, Hegel 
clearly says that “infinity” is achieved here not by 
“consciousness itself”, but only by “our 
consciousness” (Hegel, n.d.). So, only “our 
consciousness”, perceiving the same object 
(substrate) as “consciousness itself” 
comprehends it “in an essential form”, that is in 
the form of a pure concept, or sees “infinity” in 
its movement. And the consciousness that has 
reached “infinity”, or directly distinguishes the 
distinction in its subject, acts as self-
consciousness (Hegel, n.d.). 
 
If we take into account only what was said 
above about the structure of the object of the 
phenomenological movement and “infinity” as its 
goal (namely that first “infinity” is achieved by 
“our consciousness” as occupying a “more 
convenient” place in the structure of objectivity, 
and then if it should open itself to “consciousness 
itself”), one could conclude that immediately 
after reaching the “infinity” in Chapter III by “our 
consciousness” — the completion of the “first 
circle” — the movement in the “second circle” 
of The Phenomenology should begin. But in 
reality, “our consciousness”, “consciousness 
itself” and “object”, as mentioned above, are 
participants in a single “dialogue” of the 
“experience of consciousness” that binds them: 
they “exchange words” in the course of the 
movement of experience, therefore the 
fundamental for our understanding за the plot of 
Hegel’s book is the question about the 
correlation between the representations of the 
movement of “our consciousness” and the 
movement of “consciousness itself”. 
 
The Phenomenology’s “storyline” implies that 
the evolution of all participants within the 
“phenomenological dialogue” occurs 
“concurrently” in the same “timeframe” of the 
“experience of consciousness”. But how, then, 
should the “plot” of the story be organized? 
Should the description of the movement of “our 
consciousness” in the narrative be combined 
(intertwined) with the image of the movement of 
“consciousness itself”, which, it would seem, 
after reaching “infinity” by “our consciousness”, 
should recapture the initiative? Or, on the 
contrary, should it take shape in a separate form 
pattern? At this point, the author should have 
chosen the optimal order of plot composition, 
that is the order most natural for reflecting 
“experience of consciousness” as a whole, 
embracing all its “passages” and 
“intertwinements”.  
 
We note, however, that this question is not 
only “formal”, it is not only about “order of 
chapters”. If Hegel had preferred the first version 
of the plot, it would mean that the subject of 
experience – “our consciousness” - would be put 
in dependence on its object, “consciousness 
itself”, which, in turn, would conflict with Hegel 
transcendentalism, which is so clearly and 
unambiguously presented in the Introduction as a 
principle of constituting objectness in the activity 
of consciousness. Hegel chooses the second 
version of plot composition, whereby the 
description of the “object” (“dependent”) line of 
presentation of “experience” cannot begin 
earlier than the description of the evolution of 
“our consciousness” ends. Therefore, after the 
evolution of "consciousness" is over, self-
consciousness" stands in as a separate form, 
actualizing the model of “infinity”. This 
completes the development of the experience of 
"our consciousness"; and for its further 
development the "concept of spirit" will appear 
in Chapter IV: “The concept of spirit is thereby 
on hand for us” (Hegel, n.d.). This decision of 
Hegel is also reflected in the additions that he 
makes to the table of contents of the book: 
“above” the division into chapters, with 
individual “experiences” being denoted by 
Roman numerals (on the sheets printed by this 
time they are the only ones indicated (Hegel, 
1807), there is the division of the entire content 
into (A) “Consciousness”, (B) “Self-
Consciousness” and (C), for which the author 
himself did not manage to find the title, and G. 
Lasson later suggested to label it “Absolute 
Subject” (Hegel, 1907). 
 
Representation of self-consciousness as a 
separate form also corresponds to a change in 
the way of regarding “infinity”: it loses the 
character of an object appearing to the 
consciousness, while the structure itself or pure 
definiteness becomes meaningful, and not the 
connection with “sustainable existence” or 
“carrier” (as the subject matters of Hegelian 
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time’s physics in Chapter III). In this regard, it 
becomes clear why in Chapter IV Hegel is 
distracted from the "object mode" of 
"experience" and describes only the 
development of the attitude of “our 
consciousness” to “self-consciousness”, and of 
“self-consciousness” to “life”. The steps made by 
the consciousness, says Hegel, are preserved in 
self-consciousness not as entities, in-itself-being, 
but as its own moments: only their “simple self-
sufficient durable existence” is lost (Hegel, n.d.). 
So after completing the “first big circle”, wherein 
the structure of the phenomenological 
objectness was presented as a whole, the “first 
small circle” appears with the “object” (“me”) 
being “non-objective” (Hegel, n.d.). Only in the 
Chapter V (“Observing Mind”) there is a return 
to the consideration of the movement of the 
relationship between “consciousness itself” and 
“subject”. Thus, the “second circle” of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit begins. 
 
The presented statement is fundamentally 
important for understanding the method of 
constructing the structure of the finally formed 
text. But, apparently, not wanting to load the 
description of the “experience of consciousness” 
with considerations of “external reflection”, 
Hegel does not justify his choice systematically. It 
is only by separate remarks that we can judge 
that it was precisely the his choice, that is to say, 
Hegel does not leave the results generated by 
“experience” naturally (or even, as it were, 
“spontaneously”) in a “random” order, which 
seemingly gives us the right to speak about the 
conscious authorly composition of the book’s 
plot and the setting of exact relations between its 
constituent lines of development of 
“consciousness” (“big circle”, covering the 
structure of objectness as a whole) and "self-
consciousness” (“small circle", limited to 
considering the ratio of “our consciousness" and 
“consciousness itself”). Only the last page of 
“The Phenomenology” sees Hegel speak twice, 
in the solemn tone of the final fragments, about 
the problem of “organizing” the plot of the work. 
He speaks of The Phenomenology of Spirit as being 
comprehended in the concept of organizing the 
realm of the spirit (Hegel, n.d.), that is, about the 
inner and essential side of world history.  
 
However, the source of the problem we are 
dealing with is pointed out by Hegel in the 
Introduction: “n the one hand, consciousness is 
consciousness of the object, and, on the other 
hand, it is consciousness of itself; and it is both 
consciousness of what in its own eyes is the truth 
and consciousness of its knowledge of that truth” 
(Hegel, n.d.). M. Mamardashvili in his “Kantian 
variations” notes that Kant “saw that when we 
describe something in the world, the description 
of the world implicitly contains the terms of 
ourselves as the ones who understand this 
description” (Mamardashvili, 2002). Actually, in 
The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel 
purposefully and methodically completes the 
process (started by Kant) of identifying and 
comprehending self-consciousness as the main 
“hidden prerequisite” of describing the world. In 
that he is relying on the concepts of “experience” 
and “consciousness”, which are widely used in 
philosophy due to the Kantians, above all 
(Reinhold, 1963). The Hegelian conclusion to the 
comprehension of the role of self-consciousness 
in the movement of "experience" reveals that 
"not merely is consciousness of things only 
possible for a self-consciousness; rather, it is this 
self-consciousness alone which is the truth of 
those shapes” (Hegel, n.d.). Self-consciousness 
as the truth of all the preceding forms of 
(objective) consciousness, is the “truth” within 
Hegel’s method of constructing the plot of The 
Phenomenology, and it completes the movement 
of the “first circle”. A description of self-
consciousness, albeit still being revealed only for 
“our consciousness”, and not as “a unity with 
consciousness itself” (Hegel, n.d.), should - 
before the movement of the narration returns to 
the phenomenological objectness as a whole - to 
act as a separate form: “consciousness as it 
immediately possesses this concept ones again 
comes on the scene as its own form or as a new 
shape of consciousness” (Hegel, n.d.). 
 
However, an even more important 
circumstance that confirms the significance of the 
decision taken by Hegel to coordinate the “big” 
and “small” “circles” in the structure of The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit is the reproduction of 
the relationship between them throughout the 
whole further narrative, that is, on the material 
of the second and third “circles”. So, in the 
“second circle”, despite the fact that the Chapter 
V is clearly not a complete text, but rather a 
sequence of sketches of varying degrees of 
completion, “consciousness” corresponds to V.A 
and “self-consciousness” corresponds to V.B and 
V.C, while in the “third circle”, respectively, 
there are Chapter VI, Chapter VII and Chapter 
VIII (Korotkikh, 2011); these fragments can be 
considered as the equivalent of “consciousness” 
and “self-consciousness” in the movement of 
“consciousness itself” and “object”.  
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Discussion 
 
The fact that the emergence of the concept of 
structure in the analysis of The Phenomenology 
of Spirit can be regarded as natural is associated 
with the present tendency towards revealing the 
integrity, orderliness and the consistency of the 
components of Hegelian opus, as well as with the 
desire to get rid of the aftermath caused by the 
decades of unreasonable use of “evolutionary 
historical” method, which excludes the 
possibility of raising the question of the 
"synchronous" interaction of elements within the 
Hegelian system of philosophy.  
 
It should be noted that it was A. Losev among 
Russian philosophers, who pointed out the 
absence of the term “structure” in Hegel’s 
aesthetics: “Hegel does not use the term 
structure. However, that original objectivity, 
created by the artist’s genius, according to Hegel, 
undoubtedly has its own original structure...” 
(Losev, 1994); “Hegel uses neither the term 
structure, nor the term model. Yet, it is clear that 
in his argument about the artistic situation and 
artistic action, he, of course, means the same 
thing as we do when we talk about the artistic 
structure” (Losev, 1994). Sure enough the 
“original construction” of objectness, which in 
the modern philosophical language is indeed 
most clearly expressed in the concept of 
structure, is characteristic not only of Hegel's 
aesthetics, but even more so of his 
Phenomenology and Logic. 
In recent decades, this concept has already 
been used in Hegelian studies (Labarriere, 1968; 
Puntel, 1981; Stewart, 1998), although, perhaps, 
it has not yet become a familiar, “technical” term 
in the process of interpreting Hegelian texts. To 
what extent, however, does it contradict the 
current practice of using the evolutionary 
historical method? If we understand, O. Pöggeler 
does, “the idea of Phenomenology” as Denkweg 
(Pöggeler, 1973), even in this case “Logic” as the 
implementation of the “Absolute knowledge” 
achieved in Phenomenology does not leave any 
doubt that the “way of thinking” nevertheless 
merges into Denken, which is indifferent to 
“worldly” time and therefore is available to 
structural analysis as a system of synchronous 
relations. We surely must take into account that 
the dramatic story of the birth of the book left an 
imprint on the nature of the fulfilling the author's 
intention; but it is unlikely that the students of 
Hegel's thought, who have already come to 
realize the meaning of the concept of structure 
for understanding his heritage, will ever return to 
understanding The Phenomenology of Spirit’s 
content as “chaotic” (Gajm, 2006) or to 
regarding its creation as “spontaneous” and its 
composition as “inorganic” (Haering, 1932, 
1934). 
 
Obviously, the attitude towards revealing the 
integrity and coherence of The Phenomenology of 
Spirit is also backed by the evolution of interest 
in the substantive aspects of Hegelian book. It 
can be said that past interpretations have focused 
on the social, historical and existential 
components of The Phenomenology. It is unlikely 
that today someone will decide to assert that the 
book can be presented as an understanding of 
history and culture of mankind, as the specifics of 
this “understanding” have not yet been 
determined by any of the supporters of the 
“realistic” reading of The Phenomenology. In 
recent years, Hegelian studies community has 
been increasingly occupied by the task of 
studying the significance of The Phenomenology 
for the development of the logical and 
methodological aspects of humanitarian 
knowledge. According to its plan, The 
Phenomenology does not provide some 
“information about the world”, but rather 
restores the “structure of consciousness” as a 
whole, which makes its understanding possible. 
 
At the same time, the greatest difficulties are 
associated with the understanding of the nature 
of “our consciousness” with its “point of view” 
text most often delimited in the Hegelian by 
means of “we”, and “for us“. What is the main 
difficulty of an adequate understanding of the 
nature of “our consciousness”? In my opinion, it 
is the fact that the “living” consciousness of the 
author (or the reader) and the element of the 
transcendental structure that represents the 
“subject pole” of the “consciousness itself” has to 
coincide in it. A “pole” like that has the 
“consciousness itself” as an object of “The 
Phenomenology’s” experience. The “living”, 
actual consciousness of the author or the reader 
is, as it were, “embedded” in the “consciousness 
itself” subject to direct examination. “Beneath its 
gaze” it moves and evolves. At the same time, 
the direction and nature of this evolution does 
not depend on the random, historically and 
biographically determined content of the real 
consciousness of the author and the reader, but 
only on the steps that the “experience” had 
made along with the “consciousness”. 
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In the process of studying the logic of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit’s plot development a key 
step was made by the American scholar K.R. 
Dove (1970), who showed the fundamental 
importance of the author's and the reader’s 
stance (“observing consciousness”, the point of 
view that the philosopher himself fixes using the 
pronouns “we”, “for us”) to realize the internal 
structure of the objectness of The Phenomenology 
of Spirit. 
 
Some essential characteristics of this aspect of 
The Phenomenology’s method are given by W. 
Bonsiepen, who directly speaks of the “central 
role of the philosopher” in the narrative 
movement process. He argues that 
consciousness is led by the philosopher, in 
particular, “the emergence of a new real object 
and the accompanying ‘conversion of 
consciousness’ are both carried out through the 
activities of the philosopher” (Bonsiepen, 1975). 
The circumstance noted by Bonsiepen is 
extremely important for a proper understanding 
of the “reading strategy” that “The 
Phenomenology” imposes upon us. it is indicated 
by the words from the second sentence of the 
main text: “Likewise we ourselves have to 
conduct ourselves immediately, that is, 
receptively. We therefore are to alter nothing in 
the object as its presents itself, and we must keep 
our conceptual grasp of it apart from our 
apprehension of it” (Hegel, n.d.). In fact, this 
provision applies only to the historical and 
individual components of the consciousness of 
the author and the reader mentioned above, but 
does not revoke his activity at all. It is “our 
consciousness”, as the unity of the “real” and 
transcendental components that acts as the 
source and initiator of the "experience" 
systematically described in The Phenomenology.  
 
As is known, in the past century, the thesis of 
“phenomenological” (in the Husserlian sense) 
nature of Hegel’s method was very popular, 
although it clearly contradicts both the specific 
mechanism of movement of the “experience of 
consciousness” and the characteristics of the 
method of growing creation, which in the final 
part of “Introduction” is presented by the 
philosopher himself. However, on the other 
hand, in the 19th and 20th centuries, the activity 
of “our consciousness” didn't escape the 
attention of certain readers, and was not 
reduced to the “living” consciousness of the 
author and the reader. Thus, the advantage of 
the point of view of “our consciousness” over 
“the very consciousness” was noted, for 
example, by J. Erdman: “Since our business is 
only to facilitate the understanding of the 
consciousness of ourselves, the forward 
movement in The Phenomenology is always 
carried out in such a way that consciousness sees 
what we already know that in itself it is exactly 
that (or that it is for us)” (Erdman, 1973). 
Hegelian studies regard the role of “our 
consciousness” as the initiator of the 
phenomenological movement and the 
systematizer of “experience”, revealing its 
“scientific” character. This line of thinking is 
present in the most consistent way in the 
insightful works of W. Marx (1975, 1981).  
 
In recent years, new incentives for analyzing 
the structural aspects of Hegelian philosophy 
have emerged in connection with attempts to 
present a non-metaphysical image of Hegel’s 
philosophy (Gupta, 2004; Kreines, 2006; 
Lumsden, 2008). Despite the variety of 
interpretations of Hegelian philosophy that have 
appeared over the course of two centuries, the 
common feature was the desire to “tie” its 
objectness to one or another type of “existence”. 
As a result, the understanding of the uniqueness 
of Hegelian thought, which frees objectness from 
the connection with “existence” and makes it 
possible to determine the nature of philosophical 
knowledge and the place of philosophy in the 
system of sciences more accurately was lost. The 
solution of this very problem is associated with 
the old idea of Hegelian philosophy as the end of 
the history of entire classical European 
philosophy. If we consider only The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, then it should be noted 
that the prevailing Marxist or existentialist 
interpretations have so far presupposed the 
possibility of exclusively "realistic" readings of 
Hegelian book. Using the concept of structure, 
indicating that the internal content of elements is 
equivalent to a set of external relations and, 
therefore, their “behavior” can be understood 
on the basis of establishing a place in the system, 
we fend off the need to search for “real” 
correlates of phenomenological gestalts, 
although, as we said above, the coincidence of 
the point of view of “our consciousness” with the 
“living” consciousness of the author and the 
reader represents, indeed, a very subtle aspect 
of the search for an adequate method of reading 
The Phenomenology of Spirit. 
 
Among Russian scholars it is A. Vlasov, who 
shows a fairly accurate understanding of the 
structure of The Phenomenology’s object, where 
“our consciousness” occupies a position that 
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provides it with an advantage in understanding 
“experience” (Vlasov, 1997) (although he does 
not use this expression). Some researchers 
describe the difference in the presentation of 
“experience” of “our consciousness” and 
“consciousness itself” as an author's technique, 
pursuing a “pedagogical” goal, which, of course, 
does not to any extent mean denying its 
significance for the “experience” movement 
(Westphal, 2010). At the same time, it should be 
stated that the exact characteristics of the 
structure of the subject The Phenomenology of 
Spirit and the specificity of the method due to it 
were absent in the scientific literature so far, and, 
which is especially important in the context of 
the problems discussed in our article, none of the 
researchers did not consider the structure of The 
Phenomenology of Spirit objectness as a basis for 
solving the problem of establishing the structure 
of the text. 
 
The above presented characteristics of the 
Hegelian method shows that the “leading” role 
of “our consciousness” in the movement of The 
Phenomenology of the Spirit is due to the place it 
occupies in the structure of objectness. In the 
"Introduction" Hegel brilliantly shows that “our 
consciousness” is “one step” ahead of 
“consciousness itself” precisely because it sees 
the emergence of its object, and this process is 
inaccessible for observation for a consciousness 
submerged in experience, occurring “as if behind 
the consciousness's back”: “it takes place for us, 
as it were, behind the back of consciousness” 
(Hegel, n.d.). Things that “consciousness itself” 
experiences “only as objects” appears “at the 
same time as a movement and a coming-to-be” 
(Hegel, n.d.) for “our consciousness”. Due to the 
fact that, modeling the phenomenological 
situation by means of the above-mentioned 
“stratification of consciousness”, “our 
consciousness” is freed from a direct connection 
with the object (it looks at it with the view of 
“consciousness itself”), it also sees the need for 
the entire sequence of forms of consciousness. 
Therefore it elevates the “experience of 
consciousness” to a systematic form, that is, to 
the status of science.  
The construction of The Phenomenology with all 
its passages and intertwinements of “gestalts” 
that form its movement is possible only due to 
the special position and status of “our 
consciousness” in the structure of 
phenomenological objectness. But, historically 
and “biographically”, a certain content of “our 
consciousness” doesn’t affect the performance 
of this function. In this connection, it is necessary 
to recognize as erroneous the widespread 
assertion that “we” should be identified with a 
kind of “absolute” view of the object, (see, for 
example, (Pöggeler, 1973). Indeed, an 
identification like that would deprive the author 
and the reader of the need for a real 
“experience”; from the very beginning they 
should have possessed the knowledge necessary 
for recreation of the “experience of 
consciousness”. This knowledge can be 
“conquered” only after passing through all the 
stages of the “phenomenological ladder”. 
Actually, we know that the “real” author did not 
possess such knowledge: that was his reason to 
define The Phenomenology as a “journey for 
discoveries” (Nikolin, 1970). It would be even 
stranger to demand it from the reader.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Long-term studies of the problems associated 
with understanding the nature of the object and 
the method of The Phenomenology of Spirit 
consistently led to the question of the nature of 
the principles that underlie the way the plot is 
constructed. It is the “plot”, in contrast to the 
“storyline”, that determines the specifics of the 
author’s view of the subject matter that a 
philosopher can reveal. It seems that these 
studies, outlined in this article, justify our intent 
to class the principles of constructing the plot of 
The Phenomenology of Spirit as “structural”. In 
fact, the “behavior” of elements in the Hegelian 
system at all levels does not depend on their 
specific content, but is determined solely by the 
ratio of elements in the system as a whole; and 
this is the main feature of the structural methods 
used over the past one and a half centuries in 
linguistics and literary studies, anthropology, 
religious studies and a number of other 
humanitarian disciplines. I hope that this article, 
re-creating the two main principles of organizing 
the content of The Phenomenology and showing 
how they interact, not only enriches the 
methodological tools of Hegelian studies with the 
concept of structure, but also indicates possible 
directions for future studies of Hegel’s work, 
since studying the structure and dynamics of the 
plot encourages the question of the specifics of 
the narrative practices reflected in the book, in 
particular, the role of dialogism in the process of 
creating The Phenomenology’s content and the 
method of its presentation to the reader.  
 
Within the confines of the present study, it can 
be stated that the analysis of the problems of the 
plot composition of Hegel’s work, the content of 
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which is rich with heterogeneous material, and 
where, as it may seem, the author admits an 
inexplicable self-will in regard to the sequence of 
historical and cultural phenomena chosen as a 
subject, that the plot composition yields to two 
basic principles: the structure of objectness as 
the starting point of the “experience of 
consciousness” and “infinity” as the purpose of 
its two movement in each of the “circles” of The 
Phenomenology. These two principles, while 
having different nature, are intertwined in the 
Hegelian concept of self-consciousness, which, 
like a peak, attracts the climber’s view, no matter 
what slope he chooses, binds together all the 
individual lines of the “experience of 
consciousness” movement and finally opens up 
to oneself the very source of the infinite content 
of the “realm of spirits”, which the philosopher 
uses to crown his work. 
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